Two of the most well-known regularities of preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behavior of an agent who can display both tendencies at the same time. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both objective lotteries and uncertain acts, and captures both aversion to ambiguity and attraction towards certainty in objective lotteries. We show that this axiom, together with other standard axioms, is equivalent to two representations that generalize the MaxMin Expected Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . In both representations the agent evaluates ambiguity using multiple priors, but does not use Expected Utility to evaluate objective lotteries. In the first representation, lotteries are evaluated by distorting probabilities as in the Rank Dependent Utility model, but using the worst from a set of such distortions. In the second, equivalent, representation the agent treats objective lotteries as 'ambiguous objects,' and uses a set of priors to evaluate them. We show that a preference for hedging is not sufficient to guarantee an Ellsberg-like behavior if the agent violates Expected Utility for objective lotteries, and we provide a novel axiom and representation that guarantees that this is the case. JEL: D81
Introduction
A large amount of empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to the study of two classes of paradox in individual decision making: 1) violations of von-Neumann and Morgenstern Expected Utility for objective risk -most notably the Allais paradox; 2) violations of (Savage) Expected Utility for subjective uncertainty -usually called 'ambiguity aversion', as demonstrated by the Ellsberg paradox. These behaviors constitute two of the most widely studied and robust phenomena in experimental economics and the psychology of individual decision making. Two vast theoretical literatures have emerged, each aimed at generalizing standard models to account for one of the two phenomena. Much less attention, however, has been devoted to the study of the relation between the two, and to the development of models that allow both behaviors at the same time. The vast majority of models designed to explain Allais-like preferences only look at objective probabilities, while models that study ambiguity aversion either do not consider objective probabilities (as in the setup of Savage (1954) ) or, if they do, explicitly assume that the agent follows Expected Utility to assess them (as is usually done in the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) ).
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Despite these largely separate analyses, the idea of a connection between the two classes of behavior has been informally present for decades: loosely speaking, a decision maker who is 'pessimistic' about the outcome of risky and uncertain events may display both the Allais paradox and ambiguity aversion. This conceptual connection is coupled by a technical one: both phenomena can been seen as violations of some form of linearity (or independence with respect to probability mixtures) in the preferences of the agent. Recent experimental evidence also suggests that the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes are linked empirically: Dean and Ortoleva (2012) show that subjects who display one behavior are significantly more likely to exhibit the other.
The goal of this paper is then twofold. First, we establish a conceptual link between ambiguity aversion and Allais-type behavior by showing how both could be characterized jointly using a novel axiom: a generalized notion of preference for hedging. Second, we use this axiom to characterize two equivalent representations that simultaneously capture pessimism in the domains of risk and uncertainty.
Our main behavioral axiom is a generalized notion of Hedging. Since Schmeidler (1989) , the concept of preference for hedging has been used to capture ambiguity aversion by postulating that for any two acts between which she is indifferent, a decision maker (DM) prefers the probability mixture of the two acts to the acts themselves. We extend this idea to capture pessimism over objective lotteries by replacing the notion of probability mixtures with that of outcome mixtures in the style of Ghirardato et al. (2003) : the outcome mixture of two outcomes is a third outcome, the utility of which is exactly half-way between those of the original two.
2 We define the mixture of two lotteries p and q as the set of lotteries generated using outcome mixtures considering all possible joint distributions of p and q. A mixture of two acts is then defined point-wise.
Our main axiom, Hedging, states that for any three acts f, g, and h, if f and g are indifferent to each other and h can be obtained as a mixture between f and g, then h must be weakly preferred to both. When applied to lotteries, we argue that a pessimistic DM will exhibit a preference for hedging because it reduces the variance of utility outcomes.
3 When applied to acts, hedging reduces subjective uncertainty by mixing the outcomes that acts return in each state (which motivates the axiom in Schmeidler (1989) ).
We show that our generalized preference for hedging, along with other standard axioms, characterizes two equivalent models that generalize the Maxmin Expected Utility (MMEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to allow for Allais-style behavior. In both representations, the decision maker evaluates acts as in MMEU: having evaluated the outcome of the act in each state, she considers a set of priors Π over the states of the world, and takes expectations using the worst of the priors in Π. Where these models differ from MMEU is that objective lotteries are not assessed using Expected Utility. In our first representation, the agent distorts probabilities using a procedure similar to the Rank Dependent Utility Model (RDU) of Quiggin (1982) , but considers a set of convex (pessimistic) probability distortions, and uses the worst one of them to evaluate the objective lottery. This is a strict generalization of RDU with convex distortion. In Section 2.3 we argue how this flexibility is desirable, as it allows the model to capture forms of pessimism that RDU cannot capture.
In our second, equivalent, representation the agent first maps each lottery into an act defined on a hypothetical urn containing a measure 1 of 'balls' -as if she imagined that the objective lottery will be resolved by an extraction from this hypothetical urn. An Expected Utility agent would use the uniform prior on [0, 1] to evaluate such acts (the Lebesgue measure ). Our agent instead has a set of priors on [0, 1], which contains , and evaluates lotteries using the worst of them. This leads her to distort the probabilities of objective lotteries in a 'pessimistic' fashion. This representation illustrates the similarities between pessimism in the objective and subjective domains.
In both representations there is a sense in which the decision maker could be thought of as ambiguity averse, as she evaluates acts by using the most pessimistic of a set of priors. However, this does not mean that she will exhibit the Ellsberg paradox: if the distortions of objective lotteries are 'stronger' than those of the subjective ones, then the opposite of Ellsberg behavior may occur. 4 We introduce a novel additional axiom that rules out this possibility. Adding this axiom to our framework generates a third representation, in which the DM again evaluates objective lotteries using the worst RDU distortion from a set (like the first representation above). To evaluate acts, however, the DM again has a set of priors over the states of the world,Π, but evaluates each act in two steps: first, she transforms each act into a lottery using the worst prior inΠ; second, she evaluate this lottery as she does with other lotteries, using the worst distortion in a set of convex RDU distortions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal setup, the axioms, and the first representation theorem. Section 3 studies the special case in which the agent always distorts subjective probabilities more than objective ones. Section 4 discusses the relevant literature. The proofs appear in the appendix.
The Model

Formal Setup
We consider a standard Anscombe-Aumann setup with the additional restrictions that the set of consequences is both connected and compact. Consider a finite (non-empty) set Ω of states of the world and a (non-empty) set X of consequences, which we assume to be a connected and compact subset of a metric space.
5 As usual, by ∆(X) we denote the set of simple probability measures over X, while by F we denote the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts f : Ω → ∆(X). We metrize ∆(X) in such a way that metric convergence on it coincides with weak convergence of Borel probability measures. Correspondingly, we metrize F using point-wise convergence.
Our primitive is a complete, transitive, non-degenerate binary relation on F, whose symmetric and asymmetric components are denoted by ∼ and .
We use some additional standard notation. We denote by δ x ∈ ∆ the degenerate lottery (Dirac measure at x) that gives the prize x ∈ X with certainty. For any x, y ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1), we denote by αx + (1 − α)y the lottery that returns x with probability α and y with probability (1 − α). For any p ∈ ∆(X), we denote by c p , the certainty equivalent of p, the elements of X such that p ∼ δ cp . With the usual slight abuse of notation, for any p ∈ ∆(X) we denote by p the constant act in F such that p(ω) = p for all ω ∈ Ω. When |Ω| = 1, this setup coincides with a standard preference over vNM lotteries, a special case of particular interest for our analysis.
We note that we use the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) for convenience, as it allows for both risk and uncertainty, and because it makes the comparisons with other models more direct. However, it is straightforward to translate our results into an alternative setup in which preferences are defined over the union of simple vNM lotteries on X, and Savage acts with consequences X, i.e., preferences over ∆(X) ∪ X Ω .
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Axioms and Subjective and Objective Mixtures 2.2.1 Basic Axioms
We start by imposing some basic axioms on our preference relation. To this end, we use the following standard definition of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD).
Definition 1. For any p, q ∈ ∆(X), we say that p First Order Stochastically Dominates q, denoted p F OSD q, if p({x : δ x δ z }) ≥ q({x : δ x δ z }) for all z ∈ X. We say p F OSD q, if p F OSD q and p({x : δ x δ z }) > q({x : δ x δ z }) for some z ∈ X.
We then posit three standard axioms on the relation .
A.1 (FOSD).
For any p, q ∈ ∆(X), if p F OSD q then p q, and if p F OSD q then p q.
5 It is standard practice to generalize our analysis to the case in which X is a connected and compact topological space, or to the case in which the state space is infinite. To do the latter, we would need to adapt the Continuity axiom: see Section 2.2.1, and specifically the discussion after Axiom 3.
6 This alternative setup might be appealing as it contains no assumptions on the timing of resolution of uncertainty and risk (as opposed to the one in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) ).
A.2 (Monotonicity
A.3 (Continuity). The sets {g ∈ F : g f } and {g ∈ F : g f } are closed for all f ∈ F.
Axiom 1 imposes that our preference relation respects FOSD when applied to objective lotteries. Axiom 2 is the standard monotonicity postulate for acts: if an act f returns a consequence which is better than what another act g returns in every state of the world, then f must be preferred to g. Axiom 3 is a standard continuity assumption. 7 2.2.2 Outcomes-Mixtures and the approach of Ghirardato et al. (2003) As we are interested in the study of preferences that may violate Expected Utility over objective lotteries, it will be convenient to use a notion of 'mixture' that does not rely on Expected Utility. We follow the approach of Ghirardato et al. (2003) to define the notion of 'outcome mixture' for the consequences in X.
8 In the next section we will then extend this idea to outcome mixture of lotteries and of acts.
Consider two consequences x, y ∈ X and suppose that, in the context of some model, the agent assigns a utility to all elements of X. We wish to identify the element with a utility half-way between that of x and y. For example, if we knew that the utility function of the agent is linear on X ⊆ R, we could simply take the element
y. More generally, Ghirardato et al. (2003) introduce a technique that allows us to elicit this element for any continuous utility function, as long as preferences are well-behaved (in a sense discussed below). In what follows we adapt their technique, originally developed for Savage acts, to the case of objective lotteries.
Definition 2. For any x, y ∈ X, if δ x δ y we say that z ∈ X is a 
We denote z by
The rationale of the definition above is the following. Consider some x, y, z ∈ X such that δ x δ z δ y and such that (1) holds. The lottery on the left is simply a 50% chance of x and a 50% chance of y. The lottery on the right is a 50% chance of two other outcomes. The first is the certainty equivalent of a 50% chance of x and a 50% chance of z. The second is the certainty equivalent of a 50% chance of z and a 50% chance of y. Under Expected Utility these lotteries will be indifferent if and only if z has a utility exactly half-way between that of x and y. Ghirardato et al. (2003) show that this is also true for all preferences in 7 To extend our analysis to an infinite state space we would have to adapt the Continuity axiom and require: 1) {α ∈ [0, 1] : αf + (1 − α)g h} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : h αf + (1 − α)g} are closed; and 2) {q ∈ ∆(X) : q p} and {q ∈ ∆(X) : q p} are closed for all p ∈ ∆(X). We would then obtain representations identical to ours, but in which the measures over Ω are just finitely additive. Adding Arrow's Monotone Continuity Axiom would then guarantee countable additivity (see Chateauneuf et al. (2005) ).
8 Similar approaches to define mixtures of consequences were used in Wakker (1994) , Kobberling and Wakker (2003) , and in the many references therein. the much broader class of 'locally bi-separable' preferences -essentially, those for which a cardinally unique utility function can be identified. (See below for a formal definition.)
Since X is connected and preferences are continuous, such an outcome-mixture will always exist. Furthermore, we can extend this definition to any other mixture λx ⊕ (1 − λ)y for any dyadic rational λ ∈ (0, 1) simply by applying the definition above iteratively.
9 For simplicity of notation, in most of the following discussion we drop the subscript and denote the mixture above only by ⊕. We refer to Ghirardato et al. ( , 2003 for further discussion.
Even though in our setting the element
z). Or, we can combine them in yet many other ways depending on the assumptions on their joint distribution. This means that for any two lotteries we have a set of possible mixtures.
More generally, notice that we can view any two lotteries p and q as random variables on some underlying measure space, V p and V q . Indeed there are many ways to construct such random variables, each of which would entail the same distribution over prizes for V p and V q separately, but would generate different joint distributions of their returns. For any given joint distribution, we can construct a third random variable that returns prizes with utilities that are exactly the mixture of the utilities of the prizes returned by the original lotteries. This is, we construct the random variable
V q . This in turns defines a lottery r ∈ ∆(X). Depending on the joint distribution of V p and V q we get different lotteries.
11 We define p,q the set of all such mixtures for all possible joint distributions.
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10 While in the previous section we have focused on one particular definition of outcome mixture ⊕ of elements of X, it is easy to see how our approach below would work also for different definitions.
11 We thank Fabio Maccheroni for suggesting this interpretation. 12 A more direct construction would proceed as follows. Consider any lottery p and q, and notice that, because both are simple lotteries, we could always find some x 1 , . . . x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ X, and some 
This concept of mixing of objective lotteries is similar to the standard notion of mixing of two financial assets in order to create a portfolio, with two substantial differences. First, we make no assumptions on the joint distribution of the lotteries, and thus we obtain the set of possible portfolios -one for each joint distribution. Second, in our case the mixture takes place in utilities, rather than in the prizes: thus a mixture between $10 and $0 is not necessarily $5, but rather it is the monetary amount that yields utility half way between $10 and $0.
This latter point emphasizes an important implication. In finance, a portfolio constructed of assets of equal expected value will have the same expected value but (weakly) lower variance than the underlying assets in monetary terms. Thus the portfolio may be strictly preferred to the underlying assets by a risk averse agent. Using our definition, instead, the mixture of two lotteries of equal expected utility will lead to a lottery with the same expected utility but a weakly lower variance than the underlying lotteries in utility terms. While this should make no difference to an expected utility maximizer, regardless of their risk attitude, we argue below that a pessimistic agent may prefer such a reduction.
Finally, we define the notion of outcome-mixtures for acts. We do so point-wise: an act h is a 1 2 -mixture between two acts f and g if h(ω) ∈ f (ω),g(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, that is, if for every state it returns a lottery which is a mixture between the lotteries returned by f or g. We denote f,g the set of all such mixtures of two acts.
Main Axioms
We are now ready to introduce the main axiom of this paper: Hedging.
A.5 (Hedging). For any f, g ∈ F, and for any h ∈ f,g , if f ∼ g, then h f .
We argue that this axiom captures both pessimism in the form of ambiguity aversion and pessimism in the form of violations of EU as suggested by the Allais paradox. Let us start from the latter, and consider two lotteries p and q such that p ∼ q, and a lottery r that could be obtained as a mixture between p and q, i.e., r ∈ p,q .
The first thing to notice that is that any Expected Utility agent should be neutral to this form of hedging, i.e., should rank r ∼ p ∼ q. For an expected utility maximizer, p ∼ q only if the expected utility of p is equal to that of q. r must therefore have the same expected utility, but will have weakly lower variance in utilities than either p or q. And while a risk averse EU agent might prefer to reduce the variance in dollar amounts, she must be neutral to variance in utilities: as the EU functional is linear in utilities, it is indifferent to its variance.
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By contrast, we propose that an agent who violates EU as suggested by the Allais paradox will not be neutral to this form of hedging. Almost by definition, such agent dislikes exposure to risk more than what can be explained by the curvature of the utility function, and therefore must be averse also to the variance in utilities. Our agent should thus (weakly) prefer r to 13 In fact, as we analyze in Appendix B, there is a sense in which Expected Utility could be defined by such neutrality to hedging. To see it in the algebra, recall that (footnote 12) we must be able to find some x 1 , . . . x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ∈ X, ∃γ 1 , . . . ,
. Under Expected Utility we must have that u(
, which means that if the expected utility of p and of q are the same, so must be that of r. p or q, no matter how r is constructed: just as in finance a risk averse EU agent who is indifferent between two portfolios must weakly prefer a mixture between them, no matter what their correlation is, here an Allais-like agent should weakly prefer a hedge in utilities between two lotteries, no matter how it is constructed.
To give an example, consider a lottery p which returns $10 and $0 with probability 1 2 , and for simplicity think about its mixtures with an identical lottery. Clearly the two original lotteries must be indifferent. Now consider their mixtures. If we consider these two lotteries as perfectly correlated, we obtain back original lottery p -which will of course be indifferent to the original lotteries. But we can also construct a mixture assuming that the two lotteries are perfectly negatively correlated: when one returns $10, the other returns $0, and viceversa. In this case the mixture in utilities gives a degenerate lottery that returns, with probability one, the dollar amount $0. Thus, the act of mixing has removed all the variance in utilities. While an Expected Utility agent will be indifferent to such change -the expected utility of p is exactly that of $0 -an Allais-like agent should appreciate such reduction of variance and be attracted to this degenerate lottery. More generally, any lottery obtained as a mixture of p with an identical one is more 'concentrated towards the mean' than p itself in utility terms. A 'pessimistic' agent should like this 'pulling towards the mean' in utility terms, as it reduces her exposure, and thus exhibit a preference for hedging.
This argument can easily be extended to hedging between acts. For simplicity, consider two non-degenerate acts f, g ∈ F such that f ∼ g and such that f (ω) and g(ω) are degenerate lotteries for all ω. Now consider some h ∈ f,g , and notice that
. Since there are no lotteries involved, going from f and g to h does not affect the exposure to risk -in either case, there is none. But it will reduce the exposure to ambiguity: this is precisely the idea of the original hedging axiom of Schmeidler (1989) . 14 An agent who is not ambiguity seeking would then (weakly) prefer hedging, and she will rank h as at least as highly as f and g. Combining the two arguments of attraction towards hedging for lotteries and for acts leads us to the Hedging axiom above.
Our final axiom is the translation of the idea of the Certainty-Independence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to our setup:
15 when two acts are mixed with a 'neutral' element, their ranking should not change. As opposed to Certainty-independence, however, the 'neutral element' will not only be a constant acts, but a degenerate lottery, which is neutral from the point of view of both risk and ambiguity. We again make use of outcome mixtures as our agent could have non-linear reactions to probability mixtures.
16
A.6 (Degenerate-Independence (DI)). For any f, g ∈ F, dyadic λ ∈ (0, 1), and for any 14 In fact, if we impose Independence for elements of ∆(X), then a preference for hedging in outcome mixtures is identical to preference for hedging in probabilities. In turns, when applied only to acts that map to degenerate lotteries, this is precisely the axiom suggested in Ghirardato et al. (2003) .
15 A preference relation satisfies Certainty-Indepedence if for any f, g ∈ F, and for any p ∈ ∆(X) and λ ∈ (0, 1), we have f g iff λf
16 This axiom is strictly weaker than Certainty-Independence, as the latter implies standard independence on constant acts, which in turn implies that probability mixtures and outcome are indifferent for her -we must have λf + (1 − λ)δ x ∼ λf ⊕ (1 − λ)δ x for all f ∈ F, x ∈ X, and λ ∈ (0, 1). But then, CertaintyIndependence would naturally imply the axiom below.
First representation: multiple RDU distortions
We are now ready to discuss our first representation. To this end, it will be useful to recall the Rank Dependent Utility model for preferences over lotteries in ∆(X).
Definition 3. We say that a function ψ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a probability weighting if it is increasing and it is such that ψ(0) = 0, ψ(1) = 1. For every non-constant function u and for every probability weighting ψ, we say that a function is a Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) function with utility u and weight ψ, denoted RDU u,ψ , if, for any enumeration of the elements of the support of p such that x i−1 x i for i = 2, . . . , |supp(p)|, we have
The main feature of the RDU model is that the decision maker follows a procedure similar to Expected Utility, except that she distorts the cumulative probability distribution of each lottery using a probability weighting function. The RDU model has many desirable properties, such as preserving continuity (as long at the probability weighting is continuous) and FOSD. Depending on the shape of ψ, moreover, it allows for attraction or aversion towards certainty: the former takes place when ψ is convex, leading to an Allais-like behavior; the opposite takes place when ψ is concave; when ψ is linear it coincides with Expected Utility.
17 The RDU model is arguably the most well-known model of non-Expected Utility for objective lotteries. The Cumulative Prospect Theory model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , for example, is built on its framework.
We are now ready to introduce our first representation.
Definition 4. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation on F. We say that admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Convex Rank Dependent Representation (MP-MC-RDU) (u, Π, Ψ) if there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a convex and compact set of probability measures Π on Ω, and a convex, (point-wise) compact set of differentiable and convex probability weightings Ψ such that is represented by the functional
where U : ∆(X) → R is defined as
In a Multiple Priors and Multiple Convex RDU representation the decision maker is endowed with three elements: a utility function u; a set of priors Π over the states in Ω; and a set of convex probability weightings Ψ. With respect to ambiguity, her behavior is conceptually identical to the MaxMin Expect Utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) : she has a set of priors Π on the states of the world, and she uses the worst one of them to aggregate the utilities returned in each state of the world. Where the model differs from MMEU is in the evaluation of objective lotteries. Instead of following vNM Expected Utility, the agent has a set of convex probability weightings Ψ, and she uses the worst one of those in a RDU functional to evaluate objective lotteries.
Since each of the probability weightings in Ψ is convex, hence 'pessimistic,' and since the agent uses the worst one of them for the lottery at hand, the agent will have 'pessimistic' evaluations of objective lotteries, generating violations of Expected Utility in line with the Allais paradox. In particular, the model allows for Allais-like behavior, and rules out the opposite preference -see Appendix A. (When Ψ contains only the identity function, the model coincides with MMEU with continuous Bernoulli utility.)
Even in the case of only objective risk, i.e., when |Ω| = 1, our model is a strict generalization of RDU with convex distortions. We will now argue that this additional flexibility could be desirable. Consider the lotteries p = $10, 000. Under RDU, the agent must use the same probability distortion for both p and q: the rank of the three outcomes is the same, and since in RDU only the relative rank matter, the probability distortion is restricted to be the same.
18 In particular, under RDU the agent distorts the intermediate outcome in the same way -despite the fact that in p this intermediate outcome is comparably 'very bad,' while in q it is comparably 'very good'. By contrast, the MP-MC-RDU model allows for the case in which in p both the probabilities of $0 and of $1 are much overweighted and the probability of $10,000 is underweighted; while for q only the probability of $0 is overweighted, and both that of $9,999 and of $10,000 are underweighted -a behavior which we believe is more in line with standard notions of pessimism.
To further illustrate the relation with RDU, recall that, as noted in the literature, the RDU representation is formally identical to the Choquet Expected Utility model of Schmeidler (1989) : in a setup with a fixed state space and an objective probability distribution over these states, the axioms of Schmeidler (1989) together with a form of First Order Stochastic Dominance leads exactly to RDU for acts defined on this space.
19 In a similar spirit, we use a generalized version of Schmeidler (1989) 's hedging axiom to obtain a representation similar to MMEU for risk. Intuitively, our model of decision making under risk compares to RDU in a similar way to which the Choquet Expected Utility compares to MMEU -hence the differences between RDU and our model discussed above.
If a preference relation admits a MP-MC-RDU (u, Π, Ψ), then in many cases we can add redundant elements to Ψ by adding distortions which are less severe than those already present, and that will therefore leave the behavior unchanged. 20 We therefore define a notion of 'minimal' representation, in which these redundant elements are removed.
Definition 5. We say that a set of probability weightings Ψ included in any representation is minimal if there is no Ψ ⊂ Ψ such that the same preferences can be represented by a representation of the same form that includes only Ψ instead of Ψ.
Second Representation: subjective view of objective risk
We now introduce our second representation, in which the DM treats objective probabilities in much the same way that a MMEU agent treats subjective probabilities. To this end, the following definition will be useful.
Definition 6. We say that a map µ from ∆(X) to the set of measurable functions from [0, 1] to X is measure-preserving if for all p ∈ ∆(X) and all
Intuitively, it is as if the agent imagined that an imaginary urn of measure 1 is used to determine the prize of an objective lottery: we assign to each ball in this imaginary urn a consequence in X, thus creating an act from [0, 1] to X. The prize will then be determined by extracting a ball from this urn -a visualization which is similar to those used in many experimental settings. For example, the lottery p = , 1]. Definition 6 requires this map to be 'measure preserving', i.e., such that the measure of the balls assigned to each prize corresponds to the probability of receiving that prize in the original lottery.
We can then introduce our second representation.
Definition 7. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation on F. We say that admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representation (MP-MD) (u, Π, Φ) if there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a convex and compact set of probability measures Π on Ω, and a convex and weak-compact set of Borel probability measures Φ on [0, 1], which contains the Lebesgue measure and such that every φ ∈ Φ is atomless and mutually absolutely continuous with respect to , such that is represented by the functional
for any measure-preserving map µ from ∆(X) to the set of measurable functions from [0, 1] to X.
In the MP-MD representation the agent has a set of probabilities which she uses to evaluate acts just like in MMEU. However, in this representation our agent assesses objective lotteries in the following way: first she maps the lottery into an act on [0, 1], in a measurepreserving fashion. Then she considers a set of priors Φ over [0, 1] , which includes the Lebesgue measure , and she uses the worst one of them to compute the utility of the lottery at hand. When Φ = { } her evaluation of lotteries is equivalent to vNM Expected Utility. But when Φ ⊃ { } her ranking of objective lotteries is different: she will be 'pessimistic' towards them, (weakly) lowering their evaluation by using a prior in Φ which returns a lower expected value than . Since her valuation of degenerate lotteries will not be affected -as it is independent from the prior in Φ that it is used -this leads to certainty bias and Allais-like behavior.
One possible interpretation of the agent's behavior in this representation is that she treats objective lotteries like ambiguous objects: it is as if she didn't quite know how to evaluate them -as if they were 'ambiguous for her' -and she reacted by being 'ambiguity averse' towards them, by mapping each lottery to an act and then following a procedure similar to MMEU to evaluate them.
One feature of the MP-MD representation is that it returns the same value no matter which measure preserving map used by the agent. Alternatively, we could have looked for a representation in which the agent uses a fixed, specific map. For example, we could have focused on the mapγ 'from best to worst,' i.e., a map that assigns the best outcomes to the smallest states in [0, 1] , and the worst outcomes to the higher ones.
21 A consequence of our representation theorem below will be that whenever a preference admits an MP-MD representation, which works for any map, it will also admit a representation for such specific maps. 
Representation Theorem
We are now ready to introduce our main representation theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation on F. Then, the following are equivalent (1) satisfies Axioms 1-6.
(2) admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Convex RDU Representation (u, Π, Ψ).
(3) admits a Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representation (u, Π, Φ).
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, Π and Φ are unique, and there exist unique minimal Ψ.
Theorem 1 shows that the axiomatic structure discussed above is equivalent to both representations. That is, imposing a preference for (generalized) hedging, together with other more standard axioms, is tantamount to positing that the decision-maker has a MMEU-like 21 That is, for any lottery p, enumerate the outcomes in its support from best to worst, i.e.,
22 To wit, the theorem below shows that if admits a MP-MD representation, then it must also admit a MP-MC-RDU representation with set of distortions Ψ. For any ψ ∈ Ψ, consider its derivative ψ , and call D the set of all derivatives. Indeed each element of D is a non-decreasing function, and by construction it must integrate to 1 on [0, 1]. Now consider each member of D as a PDF, and call Φ' the corresponding set of priors on [0, 1] . It is easy to see that Φ' is in fact the desired set of priors.
representation for her ranking of acts, but evaluates objective lotteries using the minimum of a set of convex RDU functionals. This itself is equivalent to the existence of an alternative representation in which the agent has a subjective, and pessimistic, view of objective risk, as captured by the MP-MD representation.
Three special cases of our representations are of particular interest: when Ψ contains only the identity function (or Φ = { }), the models coincide with MMEU (with continuous Bernoulli utility); the case in which Π is a singleton, which precludes ambiguity aversion but allows for distortions of objective lotteries; and the case in which Ψ is a singleton, in which case the ranking of objective lotteries coincides with RDU. It is clear that the first two could be obtained by imposing forms of 'hedging neutrality.' For brevity, we discuss these conditions in Appendix B. To characterize the case in which Ψ is a singleton it will suffice to add one of the axioms suggested in the literature to guarantee that the preferences are of the RDU form for objective lotteries: for example, the Probability trade-off consistency Axiom of Abdellaoui (2002) , or some of the equivalents of Schmeidler (1989) 's axiom of Comonotonic Independence, e.g., both the Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle and the Comonotonic Mixture Independence axioms of Chateauneuf (1999) . 
A comparative notion of attraction towards certainty
We now show that the comparative notion of ambiguity aversion introduced in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) translates to our setup and implies both more ambiguity aversion and more probability distortions for objective lotteries. Consider two decision makers, 1 and 2, such that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1: whenever 1 prefers a certain option δ x to some act f , so does 2. This could be interpreted in two ways. First, both agents treat both probabilities and events in the same way, but 2 has a utility function which is more convex than that of 1. Alternatively, the curvature of the utility function is the same for both agents, but 2 is 'more pessimistic' than 1 is. The approach of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) is to focus on this second case -looking at the relative attraction towards certainty while keeping constant the curvature of the utility function. This is obtained by focusing on the case in which ⊕ 1 = ⊕ 2 : that is, when both agents have the same approach to outcome mixtures. With this in mind, we use the following definition, introduced by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002): 24 Definition 8. Let 1 and 2 be two complete and non-degenerate preference relations on F. We say that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 2 if the following hold:
23 In turns, this implies that our axioms (esp. Hedging) together with those that characterize RDU, imply the Attraction for Certainty Axiom of Chateauneuf (1999) , or Probabilistic Risk Aversion as defined in Abdellaoui (2002) , or the pessimism condition of Wakker (2001) , since they are all implied by the existence of a convex RDU representation.
24 There are two minor differences between what follows and Definition 7 in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . First, we require ⊕ 1 = ⊕ 2 , instead of requiring that the two preferences are cardinally symmetric, as defined in Definition 5 in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) . However, these two conditions are equivalent, since both imply that the (unique) utility indexes must be positive affine transformations of each other. The second difference is in the name: they interpret it as higher ambiguity aversion, while we interpret it more simply as attraction towards certainty, as here agents could have the same aversion to ambiguity but different pessimism towards objective lotteries. (On this, see Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) and Ghirardato (2004) .)
2. for all x ∈ X and all f ∈ F δ x 1 f ⇒ δ x 2 f, and
for some x ∈ X and all f ∈ F This has specific consequences in our setup: an agent who is more attracted to certainty must have weakly larger sets of distortions for both objective and subjective uncertainty. Proposition 1. Let 1 and 2 be two complete and non-degenerate preference relations on F that admit Multiple Priors and Multiple Distortions Representations (u 1 , Π 1 , Φ 1 ) and (u 2 , Π 2 , Φ 2 ). Then, the following are equivalent:
1. 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1 ; 2. u 1 is a positive affine transformation of u 2 , Π 2 ⊇ Π 1 and Φ 2 ⊇ Φ 1 .
The Ellsberg Paradox and Relative Pessimism
In both representations above there is a sense in which the decision maker could be seen as ambiguity averse: when |Π| > 1, the agent has a set of priors and uses the worst one of those to judge uncertain events. This does not however imply that the agent will necessarily exhibit the Ellsberg paradox: both the Ellsberg behavior and its opposite are compatible with our representations, even if |Π| > 1. To see why, consider an urn with 100 balls which could be Red or Black, in unknown proportions. An experimenter will extract a ball from this urn, and the color of the extracted ball determines the state of the world, R or B. Consider the following three acts: betting on R, i.e., getting $10 if a red ball is extracted, $0 otherwise; betting on B; and an objective lottery which pays $10 or $0 with equal probability. Assume that the decision maker is indifferent between betting on Red or Black. The typical Ellsberg behavior is that the decision maker strictly prefers the objective lottery to either of the bets. Indeed this is allowed for by the MP-MC-RDU model: for example, if |Π| > 1 and Ψ contains only the identity function, the model coincides with MMEU, which is compatible with the Ellsberg behavior. However the MP-MC-RDU model is also compatible with the opposite behavior: if Π = {0.5, 0.5} and Ψ is not equal to the identity function, the agent will prefer either bet to the objective lottery as she distorts objective probabilities but not subjective ones. 25 In fact, our model does not posit that the agent should be 'more pessimistic' for subjective risk than she is for objective one. As pointed out in Wakker (2001) , Ellsberg-type behavior is a product of relative, rather than absolute pessimism, and while our Hedging axiom regulates the latter, it does not restrict the former.
26
Even though such tendency has been documented empirically (Tversky and Fox (1995) ), we now refine our model to rule out this behavior, and characterize axiomatically the special case in which the agent's behavior is always (weakly) compatible with the Ellsberg paradox.
We thus obtain a model in which the decision maker could act in line with both the Allais and the Ellsberg paradoxes, potentially at the same time, while she cannot exhibit the opposite of either.
To better express both the new axiom and the new representation, it will be useful to introduce a notation to represent the reduction from subjective to objective risk. Consider an act f ∈ F and suppose that for every state ω it returns a degenerate lottery, i.e., for all ω ∈ Ω we have f (ω) = δ y for some y ∈ X. Consider now a prior π ∈ ∆(Ω), and denote by f π the lottery in ∆(X) that is the derived from f using probabilities in π, that is, the lottery that returns f (ω) with probability π(ω). This lottery is simply the reduction of f from subjective to objective risk using prior π. (An identical notion is used in Ok et al. (2012) .) We can then extend this definition also to acts that return non-degenerate lotteries, preserving the intuition: for any act f ∈ F and prior π ∈ ∆(Ω), denote by f π the lottery that returns, with probability π(ω), the certainty equivalent of f (ω). (That is, f π denotes the constant act that yields the lottery π(ω)c f (ω) in every state.) Endowed with this notation, we can define our new axiom and representation.
A.7 (Incomplete Reduction of Uncertainty). For any
The intuition of Axiom 7 is the following. Consider some act f and suppose that the axiom is violated: for every π ∈ ∆(Ω) such that f ∼ f π , we have g g π for some g ∈ F. This means that even though the agent reduces the subjective uncertainty of f to an objective one using some π such that f ∼ f π , when evaluating the act g she uses a criterion that is more optimistic for g, as we have g g π . The axiom rules out precisely this case: the criterion used to evaluate g cannot be more optimistic for g that the one used to evaluate f . That is, if the decision maker uses different models to evaluate different acts, she should 26 One might naturally ask whether the term 'ambiguity averse' for such a decision maker would be appropriate. While this is a terminological issue and we abstain from committing to a specific view, we note how this has been subject of a discussion in the literature. On the one hand, intuitively there is a sense in which the agent is ambiguity averse, as she violates Savage Expected Utility precisely in the 'pessimistic' fashion prescribed by ambiguity aversion. In line with this intuition, the definition of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) would define her as ambiguity averse. On the other hand, when the agent exhibits the opposite of Ellsberg's behavior, then not only she violates the key empirical regularity that led to the study of ambiguity aversion, but she shows that her pessimism is smaller for subjective than for objective betsprecisely the opposite of the standard intuition of ambiguity aversion. In line with this, the definition in Epstein (1999) would classify her as not ambiguity averse. Wakker (2001) , Section 6, suggests how we should view the Allais paradox as reflecting 'absolute' pessimism, while the Ellsberg paradox as a 'relative' one, because it suggests that more pessimism for subjective uncertainty than for objective risk. He suggests how uncertainty could be seen as comprising both ambiguity and risk, while ambiguity aversion should be taken to represent this relative concept. He would therefore classify this agent as uncertainty averse but ambiguity loving. (See also Ghirardato (2004) for more discussion.) use a model which is pessimistic with the act at hand.
It is easy to see that the Incomplete Reduction of Uncertainty is trivially satisfied by MMEU. In turn, this axiom rules out precisely the opposite of Ellsberg behavior we were considering. Consider our initial example of the urn with 100 balls, and define f and g as betting on Black and Red, respectively, and p as the objective lottery (win with 50% probability). Suppose f ∼ g p. By the axiom, we should have π ∈ ∆(Ω) such that f π ∼ f and g π g, and thus f π , g π p. But the latter is clearly impossible: since f and g are exactly complementary, no matter how π is, the corresponding lotteries cannot both be strictly better than p.
The following theorem shows that this axiom is necessary and sufficient condition to obtain a special case of our model that satisfies the Ellsberg behavior.
Theorem 2. Consider a complete and non-degenerate preference relation on F. The following are equivalent:
( 1) satisfies Axioms 1-6 and Axiom 7;
(2) there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a convex and compact set of probability measuresΠ on Ω, and a convex, (point-wise) compact set of differentiable and convex probability weightings Ψ such that is represented by the following functional: for any f ∈ F, and for any enumeration of the states in
and
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and there exists a unique minimal Ψ.
We refer to the representation above as the Joint Multiple Priors Multiple Distortions (J-MP-MD) Representation. In this representation, the agent evaluates objective lotteries as she does in a MP-MC-RDU representation. To evaluate uncertain acts, however, she follows a different procedure, in two steps: first, she considers a set of priorsΠ, and using the most pessimistic one of them she maps the (subjective) act into an objective lottery. Second, she distorts this objective lottery precisely in the same way she distorts the other objective lotteries -using the worst of a set of RDU distortions. That is, the decision maker distorts subjective acts twice. Thus, by construction, subjective acts must be distorted weakly 'more' than objective lotteries, guaranteeing that the representation is compatible with Ellsberg behavior, but not its opposite.
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Notice that a preferences that admit a J-MP-MD representation (u,Π, Ψ) also admits a MP-MC-RDU representation (u, Π, Ψ). The key observation is that the set of priorsΠ of the former is bound to be smaller that the set Π of the latter. The reason is, in a MP-MC-RDU representation the priors in Π are the only distortion applied to ambiguous acts, and must therefore include the combination of the distortions of bothΠ and Ψ.
28 (In fact, Π andΠ coincide if and only if the agent satisfies Expected Utility on objective lotteries.)
If we then follow the interpretation, often implicitly or explicitly suggested in the literature, that the set of priors is the set of the possible 'models of the world' used by the decision maker to assess subjective uncertainty and to reduce it to an objective one, then the setΠ in a J-MP-MD representation seems to be a more appropriate choice than the set Π in a MP-MC-RDU representation. This because the latter includes also the distortions applied to objective probabilities. Notice that identifying the 'correct' set of priors is not just a matter of interpretation. It could be important, for example, when studying updating: when new information about the state of the world is revealed, we could expect the agent to update her models of the world (Π), but not her distortions of objective lotteries (Ψ).
This discussion emphasizes one final point. The study of objective lotteries alongside subjective acts, as in the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , is typically considered useful for mathematical convenience, and it is used even when objective lotteries are not the main object of study. The argument above, however, suggests that to properly identify the set of models of the world (Π), and separate it from the distortions of objective lotteries (Ψ), then it is actually necessary to observe the preferences over objective lotteries as well -observing only the preferences over (Savage) acts allows us to pin down the set Π, but we wouldn't be able to separate it fromΠ. This means that even when we are only interested in modeling uncertain acts and we are not concerned with the agent's approach to objective lotteries -because, for example, we don't believe many of these exist in the real worldwe might still be interested in observing how the agent reacts to them in order to properly identify how she approaches subjective uncertainty. In turn, this means that a setup in which both subjective and objective uncertainty are involved is relevant not only for mathematical convenience, but also to properly identify the behavior that we are interested in.
Overview of the related literature
A large literature, much too large to be surveyed here, has been devoted to developing models that allow either for Allais or for Ellsberg-type behavior. However, far fewer models exist that allow for both features at the same time in setups where both phenomena could appear independently, such as that of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) . On the one hand, the majority of models meant to study Allais-like behavior focus on objective lotteries only. On the other hand, the vast majority of models meant to capture ambiguity aversion either do not consider objective lotteries, operating in the setup of Savage (1954) , or do consider them, operating in the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , but assume that agents 28 For example, consider the case in which there are two states of the world s 1 and s 2 , and supposeΠ = {π}, where π(s 1 ) = π(s 2 ) = 1 2 . Suppose also that Φ = {φ} where φ( satisfy vNM independence on objective lotteries.
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From the point of view of the literature on Ambiguity Aversion, one can see our paper as a generalization of MMEU that allows for Allais-type preferences over objective lotteries. Indeed ours is not the first paper generalize MMEU in this direction. Ghirardato et al. ( , 2003 show that one can obtain a MMEU-like representation on Savage acts by considering outcome mixtures, and disregarding objective lotteries -thus not restricting, but also not modeling, how the agent reacts to them. Drapeau and Kupper (2010) introduce a model that corresponds to one in which agents exhibit uncertainty averse preferences as in CerreiaVioglio et al. (2010) on acts that do not involve objective lotteries, and react to objective risk in a way similar to the model in Cerreia-Vioglio (2009) . A corollary to the main theorem in Klibanoff et al. (2005) generalizes their representation to the case of non-EU preferences on objective lotteries; this case, however, is not fully axiomatized, and does not model jointly the attitude towards risk and uncertainty.
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From the point of view of the literature on Allais-like behavior, we have already argued (Section 2.3) that our model is a generalization of RDU with convex distortions, and is therefore related to models of probability weighting. Safra and Segal (1998) derive a model (Lemma 4) that generalizes RDU in a similar way for the case of linear utility, assuming an axiom, Diversification, reminiscent of our Hedging (again for linear utility). In addition, our model is conceptually related to models in which in the agent does not distort probabilities, but has a set of utility functions and uses the most pessimistic one of them to evaluate to lottery. These models includes Maccheroni (2002) and the Cautious Expected Utility model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013) , both of which are special cases of the model in Cerreia-Vioglio (2009). While neither studies ambiguity aversion, instead focusing on risk, these models are conceptually related to ours -in some sense, they are their counterpart: while in our case the agent has a fixed utility function and multiple probabilities, in these models the agent uses the correct probabilities, but has multiple utility functions. In the case of Maccheroni (2002) , this conceptual difference entails also a difference in behavior, as this model need not be compatible with Allais-like behavior. The Cautious Expected Utility model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2013) is instead designed to capture Allais-like behavior, and it is characterized by one axiom designed to capture it, Negative Certainty Independence (introduced by Dillenberger (2010) ). The relationship between this postulate and our Hedging axiom remains an open question.
From a procedural point of view, our paper considers the notion of outcome mixtures. Procedures of this kind appear in Ghirardato et al. ( , 2003 , Wakker (1994) , Kobberling and Wakker (2003) , and to the many references therein. One could see our approach as the translation of the one of Ghirardato et al. (2003) to the case of objective probabilities. We 29 This is imposed through an axiom called Risk Independence, which is vNM independence for objective lotteries, and is implied by most weakenings of independence suggested in this literature (e.g., Comonotonic Independence, Certainty Independence, Weak Certainty Independence). It is also imposed in the much more general models of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2010) , Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011) , and Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2010) . (See Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) for a survey.)
30 In addition, Chew and Sagi (2008) suggest how using the notion of 'conditional small worlds' that they introduce could generate a behavior which is consistent with both the Ellsberg and the Allais paradoxes. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) also consider a general setup in which decision makers are non-Expected Utility maximizers within the same source of uncertainty (which could be objective), but may have different weighting functions for different sources, generating ambiguity aversion.
then use this approach to introduce the novel notion of outcome mixture of lotteries and of acts, a central step in our analysis.
An early approach to relating pessimism to objective and subjective uncertainty came from noting that the RDU representation is identical to the Choquet Expected Utility model of ambiguity of Schmeidler (1989) . As opposed to this literature, we study the case of simultaneous presence of ambiguity aversion and Allais-like behavior, instead of focusing on one of them.
31 Closely related to ours is Wakker (2001) , which focuses on the case in which the preferences of the agent are of the Choquet Expected Utility form for both risk and ambiguity, and shows that a generalization of the common consequence effect can be used to characterize pessimism in both the objective and subjective domains. Our generalized notion of preference for hedging could be seen as an assumption with a similar spirit, although applicable to a broader class of preferences (MMEU is more general than Choquet Expected Utility, and we have shown that our representation generalizes convex RDU). On the other hand, to define our notion we use outcome mixtures, which forces us to impose a richer structure on the space of consequences (connectedness). Wakker (2001) also shows that the conditions that imply pessimism for subjective uncertainty do not guarantee Ellsberg-type behavior in the presence of non-EU behavior over objective risk. We obtain a similar result, and include a novel axiom that allows us to characterize a model in which this is guaranteed. Segal (1987 Segal ( , 1990 ) suggested a different channel to connect the Allais and Ellsberg paradox: both could be seen as stemming from a failure of reduction of compound lotteries. In particular, Segal (1990) shows how RDU can be derived from such postulate, and Segal (1987) argues how the Ellsberg paradox could be seen in a similar light if we see an ambiguous lottery as a two-stage lottery, where the first, imaginary, stage is over the possible priors. This connection, however, is based on a specific interpretation of the Ellsberg paradox, and on the richer setup in which two-stage lotteries are observable.
32
Finally, our work is related to two recent independent working papers, Abdellaoui and Zank (2012) and Gumen et al. (2011) . The former also exploits the continuum of outcomes instead of probability mixtures to study ambiguity without committing to EU on risk, and obtains a model that generalizes the one in Schmeidler (1989) by allowing a state-dependent evaluation of objective lotteries using RDU, and a model that generalizes the one in Klibanoff et al. (2005) by allowing a (state-dependent) evaluation of objective lotteries in a similar spirit. As opposed to our work, they do not discuss preferences for hedging, or provide conditions for which the agent should be optimistic or pessimistic in either risk or ambiguity. Gumen et al. (2011) introduce a framework where they can analyze subjective distortions of objective probabilities, and use it to define a behavioral notion of 'pessimism' for risky prospects reminiscent of uncertainty aversion.
31 This is possible because we use the standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , where both features could be present at the same time and independently. By contrast, the approach followed by most of the literature would not apply in this setup, and, in general, would not apply when lotteries are elements of the simplex, as in von-Neumann Morgenstern or as in the questions of the Allais experiment: in most of these papers, lotteries are Savage acts on a given set of states of world with an objective probability distribution.
32 One could also see the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) as 'rich,' as it entails both objective and subjective uncertainty with an implicit assumption about the timing of resolution of each of them. As we argued in Section 2.1, however, this feature is irrelevant for us: we could have carried out our analysis even if we only observed the agent's preference over the union of vNM lotteries and of Savage acts.
Appendix A: Relation with the Allais Paradox
In Section 2.3 and 2.4 we have argued how both the MP-MD and the MP-MC-RDU can allow for the behavior observed in the Allais paradox. In what follows, we show that both models also rule out the possibility of an opposite preference. To wit, consider the following four lotteries: p 1 = $1, p 2 = .01 · $0 + .89 · $1 + .1 · $x, p 3 = .89 · 0$ + .11 · $1, and p 4 = .9 · $0 + .1 · $y. Recall that the Allais experiment asked subjects to compare the lotteries above assuming x = y = $5, and then observed the first lottery preferred to the second, but the fourth preferred to the third. Let us now instead choose x and y in such a way to make p 1 ∼ p 2 and p 3 ∼ p 4 . Then, we have a choice pattern which conforms with 'Allais' if and only if x ≥ y. We will now prove that this must be the case for any MP-MD representation (u, Π, Φ); for simplicity we assume that u is linear (the argument could be easily generalized). Let us define the following three events on the unit interval: E 1 = [0, 0.89), E 2 = [0.89, 090), E 3 = (0.90, 1]. Then, consider the (measure preserving) map from lotteries into acts on [0, 1] defined by the following table:
Let α be the smallest weight put on E 3 by any prior in Φ, and β be the smallest weight put on E 2 by one of the priors for which φ(E 2 ) = α. Notice first of all that we must have u(p 2 ) ≤ (1 − α − β) + αx, since p 2 could be evaluated using the prior above or a worse one, so 1 = u(p 1 ) = u(p 2 ) ≤ (1 − α − β) + αx, hence α+β α ≤ x. Notice also that we must have u(p 4 ) = αy, and u(p 3 ) ≤ min(0.11, α + β).
33 Suppose first that we have α + β ≤ 0.11. Then, we have αy = u(p 4 ) = u(p 3 ) ≤ α + β, hence y ≤ α+β α , which means x ≥ y as desired. Suppose instead that α + β > 0.11. This means that we have αy = u(p 4 ) = u(p 3 ) ≤ 0.11, so y ≤ 0.11 α . Since x ≥ α+β α and α + β > 0.11 we have x > 0.11 α , so x > y as sought.
Appendix B: Hedging-Neutrality and Restricted Violations
Both representations above allow for the simultaneous violations of both Anscombe-Aumann Expected Utility on acts, and of vNM Expected Utility on objective lotteries. We now turn to analyze the behavioral axioms that allow us to restrict violations to only one of these domains, which amounts to different forms of 'hedging neutrality.'
A.8 (Hedging Neutrality). For any f, g ∈ ∆(X), and for any
A.9 (Hedging-Neutrality on Acts). For any f, g, h ∈ F such that f ∼ g, h ∈ f,g and such that for all ω ∈ Ω we have f (ω) = δ x and g(ω) = δ y for some x, y ∈ X, we have h ∼ f .
A.10 (Hedging-Neutrality on Lotteries). For any p, q, r ∈ ∆(X) such that p ∼ q and r ∈ p,q , we have r ∼ p.
A different way to capture hedging neutrality is to posit that the agent is indifferent between subjective and objective mixtures. The following axiom imposes this in a very weak form: that there exists at least one situation in which probability and outcome mixtures coincide. 33 We know that u(p 3 ) ≤ 0.11 since Φ contains the Lebesgue measure.
A.11 (Local Neutrality for Subjective and Objective Mixtures).
There exists x, y ∈ X and a dyadic λ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ x δ y and λx + (1 − λ)y ∼ δ λx⊕(1−λ)y .
The following proposition shows the effects of including these axioms in our framework.
Proposition 2. Consider a non-degenerate preference relation that admits a MP-MD representation (c) The following are equivalent:
(1) |Π| = |Φ| = 1, and Φ = { };
(2) satisfies Axiom 8 (Hedging Neutrality); (3) satisfies Independence.
We emphasize point (b) in particular: under the axiomatic structure of the MP-MD representation, we obtain Expected Utility on objective lotteries simply by imposing Axiom 11, i.e., there exist at least one non-trivial case in which subjective and objective mixtures coincide.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of all the steps except the equivalence between (b).
(1) and (b).(4) follows standard arguments and is therefore omitted. If Φ = { } it is also trivial to see that Axiom 11 is satisfied. Assume now that Axiom 11 holds, and that admits a MP-MD representation (u, Π, Φ). By Theorem 1 we know that it will also admit a Minimal Multiple Priors and Multiple Convex RDU Representation (u, Π, Ψ). We now argue that we must have |Ψ| = 1 and that it contains only the identify function. Suppose this is not the case, and say ψ ∈ Ψ where ψ is not the identity function. Since ψ must be convex and it must be a probability weighting function (increasing, ψ(0) = 0, ψ(1) = 1), then we must also have that ψ(x) > x for all x ∈ (0, 1). But this implies that we have RDU u,ψ (αx + (1 − α)y) < αu(x) + (1 − α)u(y). Since ψ ∈ Ψ, we must then have that for all x, y ∈ X such that u(x) = u(y), and for all α ∈ (0, 1), we must have αx + (1 − α)y ≺ δ αx⊕(1−α)y , in direct violation of Axiom 11. We must therefore have that |Ψ| = 1 and that it contains only the identify function, which in turn implies Φ = { } as sought.
Appendix C: Proofs
For the purpose of this section, let us add the following notation: given some p, q ∈ ∆(X) and some A ⊆ Ω, pEq denotes the acts that yield lottery p if E is realized, and q otherwise.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of (1) ⇒ (3). The proof will proceed with the following 6 steps: 1) we construct a derived preference relation on the Savage space with consequences X and set of states Ω × [0, 1]; 2) we prove that the continuity properties of the original preference relation imply some continuity property of the derived preference relation; 3) we prove that this derived relation is locally bi-separable (in the sense of ) for some event in the space Ω × [0, 1]; 4) we prove that this derived relation admits a representation remininscent MaxMin Expected Utility in the larger Savage space; 5) we use this result to provide a representation for the restriction of to constant acts; 6) we merge the two representations to obtain the desired representation for the acts in F .
Step 1 on Ω , i.e. Σ -measurable, finite valued functions f : Ω → X. To avoid confusion, we use f , g , . . . to denote generic elements of this space. 34 Define ⊕ on F like we did in F: once we have ⊕ defined on X, for any f , g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1), αf ⊕(1−α)g is the act in F such that (αf
for all ω ∈ Ω . (Moreover, since each act in F is a function from Ω × [0, 1] into X, for all f ∈ F and for all ω ∈ Ω abusing notation we can denote f (ω, ·) : [0, 1] → X as the act that is constant in the first component (Ω) but not on the second component ([0, 1]).) We now define two maps, one from F to F , and the other from F to F. Define first of all γ
where (·) denotes the Lebesgue measure. It is easy to see that γ − 1(f ) is well defined. Now define γ :
Notice that, by construction, we must have γ(f ) ∩ γ(g) = ∅ for all f, g ∈ F such that f = g. (Otherwise, we would have some f ∈ F such that γ −1 (f ) = f and γ −1 (f ) = g, which is not possible since f = g.)
Moreover, notice that we must have that γ(δ x ) = {x}. Finally, notice that γF := ∪ f ∈F γ(f ) = F by construction. Define now on F as follows: f g if, and only if, f g for some f, g ∈ F such that f = γ −1 (f ) and g = γ −1 (g ). Define by ∼ and is symmetric and asymmetric parts. (Notice that this implies f ∼ g if f , g ∈ γ(f ) for some f ∈ F.)
We will now claim that is a complete preference relation on F .
Claim 1.
is a complete preference relation.
Proof. The completeness of is a trivial consequence of the completeness of and the fact that γ(F) = F .
Similarly, the reflexivity follows from the reflexivity of . To prove that is transitive, consider some f , g , h ∈ F such that f g and g h . By construction, we must have some f, g, h ∈ F such that f = γ −1 (f ), g = γ −1 (g ), and h = γ −1 (h ) such that f g and g h. By transitivity of , we also have f h, hence f h as sought.
Step 2. We now prove that the continuity properties of are inherited by * . For any sequence (f n ) ∈ (F ∞ , and any f ∈ F , we say that f n → f pointwise if f n (ω) → f (in the relevant topology) for all
all n, f = γ −1 (f ), and such that f n → f pointwise, then we must have that f n → f .
Proof. We will prove the claim for the case in which f n and f are constant acts, i.e. f n , f ∈ ∆(X). The extension to the general case follows trivially. Assume that f n and f as above exist: we will now prove that if p n = γ −1 (f n ) for all n, and if p = γ −1 (f ), then p n → p (weakly). Consider now some continuous v, and notice that we must have that X v(u)dp n = [0,1] v(f n )d by construction of γ. (Recall that is the Lebesgue measure.) Moreover, since v is continuous and since f n pointwise converges to f , we must then have that [0, 1] 
u)dp: in turns, this means X v(u)dp n = X v(u)dp. Since this was proved for a generic continuous v, we must have p n → p (in weak convergence).
Step 3. We now prove that is locally biseparable for some event A ∈ Σ . Consider the event A = Ω × [0, 1 2 ]. Define Σ A as the algebra generated by A, i.e. Σ A := {∅, A, A C , Ω }, and by F A the corresponding set of acts, which is a subset of F . We will now prove that the restriction of on acts measurable under A is biseparable in the sense of . We proceed by a sequence of Claims.
Claim 3. There exist x, y ∈ X such that δ x δ y .
Proof. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that δ x ∼ δ y for all x, y ∈ X. Then, we would have that p F OSD q for all p, q ∈ ∆(X). By Axiom 1 (FOSD), therefore, we would have p ∼ q for all p, q ∈ ∆(X). In turns, by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) we must have f ∼ g for all f, g ∈ F, but this contradicts the assumption that is non-degenerate.
Claim 4 (Dominance). For every f , g ∈ F , if f (ω ) g (ω ) for every ω ∈ Ω , then f g .
Proof.
Consider some f , g ∈ F such that f (ω ) g (ω ) for every ω ∈ Ω . Now consider f (ω, ·) and g (ω, ·) for some ω ∈ Ω, and notice that we have that both γ −1 (f (ω, ·)) and γ −1 (g (ω, ·)) are constant acts (in F). Since we have f (ω, A) g (ω, A) for all A ∈ Σ * , and since x y if and only if δ x δ y , then we must also have that γ −1 (f (ω, ·)) F OSD γ −1 (g (ω, ·)) by construction. By Axiom 1 (FOSD), then, we must
In turns, this means that, for the actsf ,ĝ ∈ F defined bŷ
) for all ω ∈ Ω, we havef ĝ by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). But then, notice that we must have that f ∈ γ(f ) and g ∈ γ(ĝ) by construction. But this means that we have f g as sought.
Claim 5. For any x, y ∈ X, γ
Proof. Notice first of all that, since xAy ∈ F is a constant act, then so much be γ −1 (xAy). Moreover, notice that by definition of γ −1 we must have that for all ω ∈ Ω, γ −1 (xAy)(ω)(x) = 1 2 ; similarly, for all ω ∈ Ω γ −1 (xAy)(ω)(y) = Claim 6. For every x, y ∈ X, there exists z ∈ X such that z ∼ xAy.
Proof. Consider x, y ∈ X, and notice that γ −1 (xAy) = 1 2 x + 1 2 y by claim 5. Now notice that, by Axiom 3 (Continuity) and 1 (FOSD), there must exist z ∈ X such that 1 2 x + 1 2 y ∼ δ z . We have previously observed that γ −1 (z) = δ z , which implies γ −1 (z) ∼ γ −1 (xAy), which implies xAy ∼ z as sought.
Given Claim 6, for any x, y ∈ X, define ce (xAy) := z for some z ∈ X such that xAy ∼ z.
Claim 7 (Essentiality).
A is an essential event for .
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Proof. Consider any x, y ∈ X such that δ x δ y -Claim 3 guarantee that they exist. Now consider the p = 1 2 x + 1 2 y. By Axiom 1 (FOSD) we must have δ x p δ y . Now consider the act xAy ∈ F . Notice that we have xAy(ω × [0, 5]) = x and xAy(ω × [0.5, 1]) = δ y for all ω ∈ Ω. By construction, therefore, we must have xAy ∈ γ(p), x ∈ γ(δ x ) and y ∈ γ(δ y ). By definition of , then, we have x xAy y as sought.
Claim 8 (A-Monotonicity). For any non-null event B ∈ Σ A , and x, y, z ∈ X such that x, y z we have x y ⇐ xBz yBz.
Moreover, for any non-universal 36 B ∈ Σ A , x, y, z ∈ X s.t. x, y z x y ⇐ zBx zBy
Proof. Consider an event B ∈ Σ A , and x, y, z ∈ X such that x y. Notice that by construction this implies δ x δ y . Notice also that the non-null events in Σ A are A, A C , and Ω . In the case of B = Ω we have xBz = x and yBz = y, which guarantees that x y. Now consider the case in which B = A. By Claim 5, γ −1 (xAz) = we must have zAx ∼ xAz. Similarly, we have zAy ∼ yAz. We have already proved that we must have xAz yAz, and this, by transitivity, implies zAA zAy as sought. Now consider some B ∈ Σ A which is non-universal. If B = ∅, we trivially have that x y ⇐ zBx zBy. Now consider the case in which B = A. In this case we have x y and we need to show zAx zAy: but this is exactly what we have showed above. Similarly, when B = A C , we need to show that if x y then xAz yAx -which is again exactly what we have shown before.
Claim 9 (A-Continuity). Let {g α } α∈D ⊆ F A be a net that pointwise converges to g . For every f ∈ F ,
Proof. This claim is a trivial consequence of the continuity of and of Claim 2. To see why, consider f , g ∈ F and a net {g α } α∈D ⊆ F A that pointwise converges to g such that g α f for all α ∈ D. By contruction we must have γ −1 (g α ) γ −1 (f ). Now, notice that, if g α pointwise converges to some g , then we must have that γ −1 (g α ) converges to γ −1 (g ) by Claim 2. But then, by continuity of (Axiom 3), we must have γ −1 (g ) γ −1 (f ), and therefore g f as sought. The proof of the opposite case (f g α for all α ∈ D) is analogous.
Claim 10 (A-Substitution). For any x, y, z , z ∈ X and B, C ∈ Σ A such that x z y and x z y, we have ce xBz Cce z By ∼ ce xCz Bce z Cy .
Proof. Consider first the case in which B = ∅. In this case, the claim becomes ce z Cce y ∼ ce z Cy , which is trivially true. The case C = ∅ is analogous. Now consider the case B = Ω . The claim becomes ce x Cce z ∼ ce xCz which again is trivially true. The case in which C = Ω is again analogous. 35 We recall that an event E is essential if we have x xAy y for some x, y ∈ X. 36 An event is universal if y ∼ xAy for all x, y ∈ X such that x y.
We are left with the case in which B = A and C = A C . (The case B = A C and C = A is again analogous.) In this case the claim becomes ce xAz A C ce z Ay ∼ ce xA C z Ace z C y , which is equivalent to ce z Ay Ace xAz ∼ ce z Ax Ace yAz . Now notice that since ce xAy ∈ X for all x, y ∈ X, by claim 5, we have that γ −1 (ce z Ay Ace xAz ) = 1 2 ce z Ay + 1 2 ce xAz . At the same time, consider some r, s ∈ X, and notice that, since ce rAs ∼ rAs by contruction, then we must have γ −1 (ce rAs ) ∼ γ −1 (rAs). Since γ −1 (rAs) = , which by transitivity implies γ −1 (ce z Ay Ace xAz ) ∼ γ −1 (ce z Ax Ace yAz ), hence ce z Ay Ace xAz ∼ ce z Ax Ace yAz as sought.
Notice that these claims above prove that is locally-biseparable in the sense of .
Step 4. We now prove that admits a representation similar to MMEU. We proceed again by claims.
Claim 11 (C-Independence). For any f , g ∈ F , x ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1)
Proof. Consider f , g ∈ F such that f ∼ g . Notice that we could have f ∼ g in two possible
In either case, we must have
By Axiom 6, then, we must have that for any x ∈ X and α ∈ (0, 1), αγ
Let us now consider αγ −1 (f ) ⊕ (1 − α)δ x , and notice that, by construction, we must
in fact, we must have that for every ω ∈ Ω and every y ∈ X, (αγ
In turns, this means
Claim 12 (Hedging). For any f , g ∈ F such that f ∼ g
In either case, we must have γ −1 (f ) ∼ γ −1 (g ). Now consider the act 1 2 f ⊕ 1 2 g : we will now prove that, for all ω ∈ Ω,
. To see why, notice that for all ω ∈ Ω, (
that is, for every event in [0, 1] is assigns an
x ∈ X which is the ⊕-1 2 -mixtures of what is assigned by f (ω, ·) and g (ω, ·). But this means that
. But then, we must have that
. By construction of ⊕ in the space F , then, we must have
. But then, since we have already established that we have γ
by Axiom 5 (Hedging) we must have that γ
Claim 13. There exists a continuous non-constant function u : X → R and a non-empty, weak * compact and convex set P of finitely additive probabilities of Σ such that is represented by the functional
p∈P Ω u(f )dp.
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation and P is unique. Moreover, |P | = 1 if and only if is such that for any f , g ∈ F such that f ∼ g we have
Proof. This Claim follows directly from Theorem 5 in (Ghirardato et al., 2001, page 12) , where the essential event for which axioms are defined is the event A defined above. (It should be noted that weak * -compactness of P follows as well.) The last part of the Theorem, which characterizes the case in which |P | = 1, is a well-known property of MMEU representations. (See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .)
Step 5. We now use the result above to provide a representation of the restriction of to constant acts. To this end, let us first look at the restriction of to acts in F that are constant in their first component:
Define by * the restriction of to F * .
Claim 14. There exists a unique nonempty, closed and convex set Φ of finitely additive probabilities over
u(f * (s)) dp
Proof. This result follows trivially from Claim 13 once we define Φ as projection of P on [0, 1].
Claim 15. There exists a unique nonempty, closed and convex set Φ of finitely additive probabilities over Σ * such that, for any enumeration of the support of {x 1 , . . . , x |supp(p)| }, the restriction of to ∆(X) is represented by the functional
Proof. Construct the set Φ of closed and convex finitely additive probabilities over Σ * following Claim 14, and defineV * accordingly. Notice first of all that, by construction of γ and by definition of F * , we must have that γ(p) ⊆ F * for all p ∈ ∆(X). We will now argue that, for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), we have p q if and only if f * * g * for some f * , g * ∈ F * such that γ −1 (f * ) = p and γ −1 (g * ) = q. To see why, notice that if p q, then we must have f * g * , hence f * * g * . Conversely, suppose that we have f * * g * for some
Notice now that for every p ∈ ∆(X), if f * , g * ∈ γ(p), then we must haveV (f * ) =V (g * ): the reason is, by construction of we must have
. By the previous observation this is well defined. Now notice that we have p q if and only if f * * g * for some f * , g * ∈ F * such that γ −1 (f * ) = p and γ −1 (g * ) = q, which holds if and only ifV * (f * ) ≥V * (g * ), which in turns hold if and only if V * (p) ≥ V * (q), which means that V * represents the restriction of on ∆(X) as sought.
Claim 16. * satisfies Arrow's Monotone Continuity axiom. That is, for any f, g ∈ F * such that f * g, and for any x ∈ X and sequence of events in Σ * E 1 , . . . , E n with E 1 ⊆ E 2 ⊆ . . . and ∩ n≥1 E n = ∅, there existsn ≥ 1 such that xEnf * g and f * xEng.
Proof. Consider f, g, x, and E 1 , . . . as in the claim above. Notice first of all that for any s ∈ Ω , there must exist somen such that for all n ≥n we have s / ∈ E n : otherwise, if this was not true for some s ∈ Ω , we would have s ∈ ∩ n≥1 E n , a contradiction. In turn, this means that we have xE n f → f pointwise: for any s ∈ Ω , there must exist some n such that s / ∈ E n , and therefore xE n f (s) = f (s) as sought. Notice then that by Claim 2, we must therefore have that γ −1 (xE n f ) → γ −1 (f ). We now show that we must have somē n 1 ≥ 1 such that xEn 1 f * g for all n ≥n 1 . Assume, by means of contradiction, that this is not the case:
for every n ≥ 1, there exists some n ≥ n such that g * xE n f . Construct now the subsequence of E 1 , . . . which includes these events, i.e. the events such that g * xE n f : by the previous argument it must be a subsequence of E 1 , . . . and we must have that E 1 ⊆ E 2 ⊆ . . . and ∩ n≥1 E n = ∅. This means that we have g * xE n f for all n. By contruction this then means that we have γ −1 (g) γ −1 (xE n f ). Now consider γ −1 (xE n f ), and notice that we have proved above that γ −1 (xE n f ) → γ −1 (f ) as n → ∞. By Axiom 3 (Continuity), then, we must have that γ −1 (g) γ −1 (f ), which in turns means that g * f , a contradiction.
An identical argument shows that there must existn 2 ≥ 1 such that f * xEn 2 g for all n ≥n 2 . Any n ≥ max{n 1 , n 2 } will therefore give us the desired rankings.
Claim 17. The measures in Φ are countably additive.
Proof. In Claim 16 we have showed that * satisfies Arrow's Monotone Continuity Axioms. Using Theorem 1 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) we can then show that Φ must be countably additive.
Claim 18. The measures in Φ are atomless.
Proof. We will first of all follow a standard approach and define the likelihood ranking induced by the * . In particular, define L on Σ * as
Theorem 2 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) show that every φ ∈ Φ is atomless if and only if for all Proof. Assume by means of contradiction that / ∈ Φ. By the uniqueness of Φ, we know that there must therefore exist some f ∈ F * such thatV * (f ) := min
u(f (s)) dp. Notice that, since [0, 1] u(f * (s)) dp
Suppose first of all that (A) ≥ (B). Now consider some f ∈ F * constructed as follows. Consider any C ⊆ A such that (C) = (B) and p 1 (C) > (C). (This must be possible since p 1 (A) > (A).) Notice that we must therefore have p 1 (C) > p 1 (B) since p 1 (C) > (C) = (B) > p 1 (B). Now construct the act f as:
(Notice that what we have done is that we have moved the 'bad' outcomes to some events to which p 1 assigns a likelihood above the Lebesgue measure, while we have moved the 'good' outcomes to some event to which p 1 assigns a likelihood below the Lebesgue measure.) Notice now that, by construction, we must have that f, f ∈ γ(p) for some p ∈ ∆(X), hence we must have f ∼ * f . At the same time, since p 1 (C) > p 1 (B) and since u(f (B)) < u(f (A)) = u(f (C)), we must also haveV
u(f (s)) dp =V * (f ). But this means that we haveV * (f ) >V * (f ), hence f f , contradicting f ∼ * f . The proof for the case in which (A) < (B) is specular.
Claim 20. All measures in Φ are mutually absolutely continuous, and, in particular, they are all mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure .
Proof. To prove this, we will prove that for every event E in [0, 1], if E is null for * if and only if (E) = 0.
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In turns this means that all measures are mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each other. Consider some measurable E ⊂ [0, 1] such that (E) = 0. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) > 0} = ∅. Then, consider any x, y ∈ X such that δ x δ y (which must exist by nontriviality), and construct the act yEx ∈ F * . Since {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) > 0} = ∅, then we must have that
, which in turns means that yEx ≺ * x (by Claim 14), hence yEx ≺ x.
However, notice that, since (E) = 0, we must have that γ −1 (yEx) = δ x = γ −1 (x). By construction of , then, we must have yEx ∼ x, contradicting yEx ≺ x. Consider now some measurable E ⊂ [0, 1] such that (E) > 0. We now want to show that φ(E) > 0 for all φ ∈ Φ. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) = 0} = ∅. Then, consider any x, y ∈ X such that δ x δ y (which must exist by non-triviality), and construct the act xEy ∈ F * . Since {φ ∈ Φ : φ(E) = 0} = ∅, then we must have that min φ∈Φ φ(E)u(y) + (1 − φ(E))u(x) = u(y), which in turns means that xEy ∼ * y (by Claim 14), hence xEy ∼ y. However, notice that, since (E) > 0, then γ −1 (xEy) F OSD γ −1 (y), which implies that we must have γ −1 (xEy) γ −1 (y) by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity), which implies xEy y by construction of , contradicting xEy ∼ y.
Claim 21. Φ is weak compact.
Proof. We already know that Φ is weak * compact. At the same time, we also know that every element in Φ is countably-additive: we can then apply Lemma 3 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) to prove the desired result. (Notice that this argument could be also derived from standard Banach lattice techniques: as cited by Chateauneuf et al. (2005) one could follow Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (2006) , especially Section 4.2.)
Step 6. We now derive the main representations. First of all, define asF the subset of acts in F that are constant in the second component:F := {f ∈ F : f (ω, [0, 1]) = x for some x ∈ X}. Defineˆ the restriction of toF. Now notice that there exists a convex and compact set of finitely additive probability measures Π on Ω, such thatˆ is represented by the functional
Moreover, Π is unique. Again, this trivially follows from Claim 13, where Π is the project of P on Ω.
Claim 22. For any p ∈ ∆(X) there exists one x ∈ X such that δ x ∼ p.
Proof. The claim trivially follows from Axiom 3 (Continuity) and Axiom 1 (FOSD).
By Claim 22 we know that ce(p) is well defined for all p ∈ ∆(X). Now, for any act f , construct the actf ∈ F asf (ω) := δ c f (ω) . Notice that for any f, g ∈ F, we must have f g if and only iff ḡ by Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). At the same time, notice that, by construction of γ, for every f ∈ F, |γ(f )| = 1 and γ(f )(ω, [0, 1]) = δ c f (ω) . This means also that γ(f ) ∈F for all f, g ∈ F. In turns, we must have that for all f, g ∈ F, f g if and only if γ(f ) γ(ḡ), which is equivalent to γ(f )ˆ γ(ḡ), which we know is true if and only if min π∈Π Ω π(ω)u(γ(f )(ω, [0, 1] 
At the same time, we know that for each f ∈ F, we have that γ(f )(ω, [0, 1]) = δ c f (ω) . In turns, this means that we have
At the same time, from Claim 15, we know that for all p ∈ ∆(X), u(c p ) = V * (δ cep ) = V * (p), where the first equality holds by construction of V * , while the second equality holds because V * represents the restriction of to ∆(X) and because ce p ∼ p for all p ∈ ∆(X). Given the definition of V * above, therefore, we obtain that is represented by the functional
which is the desired representation. (The uniqueness properties have been proved in the various steps.) Finally, notice that, if satisfies Axiom 8, then we must have that is such that for any f , g ∈ F such that f ∼ g we have
But then, by Claim 13 we have that |P | = 1, which implies |Π| = |Φ| = 1. Moreover, since ∈ Φ, we must therefore have Φ = { }.
Proof of (3) ⇒ (2). Consider a preference relation that admits a Multiple-Priors and Multiple Distortions representation (u, Π, Φ). The proof will proceed with the following three steps: 1) starting from a MP-MD representation, we will fix a measure-preserving function µ : ∆(X) → [0, 1] X such that it is, in some sense that we shall define below, monotone (in the sense that it assigns better outcomes to lower states in [0, 1]); 2) we will prove that we can find an alternative representation of which is similar to a Multiple-Priors and Multiple Distortions representation with (u, Π, Φ ), but which holds only for the measurepreserving map defined above, and in which the set of priors Φ on [0, 1] is made only of 'non-decreasing' priors (they assign a lower value to earlier states); 3) we will prove that this representation implies the existence of a MP-MC-RDU representation.
Step 1. Let us consider a measure-preserving function µ : ∆(X) → [0, 1] X with the following two properties: for any p ∈ ∆(X) and for any x ∈ X, µ −1 (x) is convex; for any p ∈ ∆(X) and x, y ∈ supp(p), if δ x ≺ δ y , then for any r ∈ µ −1 (x) and s ∈ µ −1 (y), we have r > s. The idea is that µ maps lotteries into acts which in which the set of states that return a given outcome is convex (first property), and such that the worse outcomes are returned always by higher states (in [0, 1]). We now define a binary relation B on Φ as follows: for any φ, φ ∈ Φ, we have φBφ if, and only if,
Notice that the relation B depends on both u and µ; notice, moreover, that we have φBφ and φ Bφ iff φ = φ , which means that B is reflexive. Finally, notice that B is also transitive by construction.
Claim 23. B is upper-semicontinuous when B is metrized using the weak metric. That is, for any (φ m ) ∈ Φ ∞ and φ, φ ∈ Φ, if φ m → φ weakly and φ m Bφ for all m, then φ Bφ.
Proof. Suppose that we have φ m , φ, and φ as in the statement of the claim. This means that for any
Notice moreover that, by construction of µ, there must exist x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X and y 0 , . . . , y n ∈ [0, 1], where y 0 = 0 and y n = 1, such that µ(p)(y) = x i for all y ∈ [y i−1 , y i ] for i = 1, . . . , n. In turns, this means that for anyφ ∈ Φ, we have [0, 1] 
. This means that we have
. At the same time, recall that φ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure: this means that, by Portmanteau Theorem 38 , since φ m → φ weakly, then we must have that
for i = 1, . . . , n. But this means that we have
Since this must be true for any p ∈ ∆(X), we therefore have φ Bφ as sought.
Step 2. Now define the set MAX(Φ, B) := {φ ∈ Φ : φ ∈ Φ s.t. φ Bφ and φ = φ}. Claim 25. For any p ∈ ∆(X) we have
Proof. Since by construction MAX(Φ, B) ⊆ Φ, it trivially follows that the right hand side of the equation is smaller or equal than the left hand side for all p ∈ ∆(X). We are left to prove the converse. To this end, say by means of contradiction that there exists some p ∈ ∆(X) and someφ ∈ Φ\MAX(Φ, B) such that [0, 1] 
This means that we cannot have φ Bφ for any φ ∈ MAX(Φ, B). Since B is transitive, we must therefore have thatφ ∈ MAX(Φ, B), a contradiction.
Define the set Φ := {φ ∈ MAX(Φ, B) : φ ∈ arg min φ∈MAX(Φ,B) [0, 1] u(µ(p))dφ for some p ∈ ∆(X)}. We now define the notion of state-increasing priors.
Definition 9. A prior φ on [0, 1] is state-increasing if there are do not exist any x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 s.t.
Claim 26. Every prior φ ∈ Φ is state-increasing.
Proof. Suppose by means of contradiction that there exists φ ∈ Φ which is not state-decreasing. This means that there exist x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 s.t.
. Now notice the following. If we have a MP-MD representation, then for any measure preserving map µ :
for all p ∈ ∆(X), for any ce p ∈ X such that δ cep ∼ p. Since this must be true for every measure preserving µ and for every p, then there must exist someφ ∈ Φ such that φ (A) =φ(A) for all
the reason is, if we take a measure preserving map µ which is identical to µ except that it maps to [x 3 , x 4 ] whatever µ maps to [x 1 , x 2 ], and vice-versa, then there must exist a prior which minimizes the utility when µ is used, and which returns 38 See (Billingsley, 1995, Chapter 5 
)dφ for all p ∈ ∆(X). Sinceφ = φ , therefore, we have thatφBφ , which contradicts the fact that φ ∈ Φ ⊆ MAX(Φ, B).
This analysis leads us to the following claim:
Claim 27. There exists a closed, weak compact subset Φ of priors on [0, 1] such that every φ ∈ Φ is state-increasing, atomless, mutually absolutely continuous with respect to such that is represented by
(Here u, Π and µ are defined above.)
Proof. Simply define the set Φ as the closed convex hull of Φ . Notice that this operation maintains the property that every φ in it is state-increasing, and that it represents the preferences. Therefore, the result follows from Claim 25 and 26 .
The set Φ in Claim 27 might not be unique. 39 However, we will now argue that there exists a unique minimal Φ , where by minimal we understand a representation with a set Φ such that there is noΦ ⊂ Φ which represents the same preferences and satisfies all the properties required by Claim 27 . Consider any minimal representation of the form above with set of priorsΦ ⊆ Φ . To prove its uniqueness, assume by contradiction that there exists another minimal representation of the same preferences with a set of priorŝ Φ =Φ . Now construct the set H as the closed convex hull of (Φ\Φ ) ∪Φ . 40 It is easy to see that we must have H = Φ, sinceΦ =Φ and by the fact thatΦ is minimal. The key observation is then to notice that (u, Π, H) is also a MP-MD representation of the same preferences. (By the uniqueness properties of it we can assume that the utility function is the same). To see why, consider first a measure-preserving map µ which maps worse outcomes to higher states in [0, 1] , as the map µ defined above. For any such map, for each lottery at least one of the minimizing priors must belong toΦ in the first representation, by construction. At the same time, the value of these acts computed using the worst prior inΦ must be equivalent to the value computed using the worst prior inΦ , because both represent the same preferences in the representation in Claim 27, hence must have the same certainty equivalents for each lottery. But then, the minimizing priors in the second representation must belong toΦ , and thus for any non-increasing map both are representations of the same preferences.
Let us now consider a map µ which is not 'non-increasing,' i.e. which need not map better outcomes to better states. Notice that for any such map in the first representation we cannot have a lottery for which the all minimizing prior belongs toΦ . To see why, notice that if this was the case, we could also construct a lottery for which the minimizing priors also belongs toΦ (for the map at hand), but for which the value computed using a prior inΦ is strictly lower if we used an 'increasing' map (as µ above) instead of µ . The reason is, we can simply consider a lottery which is 'fine enough', i.e. returns different outcomes with small probability, so that the fact that the µ is not 'non-increasing' matters. (Recall that any prior inΦ assigns lower weight to lower states, which means that using it we obtain lower values for maps that assign worse outcomes to higher states.) But this means that for this lottery we would obtain a strictly lower utility when we use a map like µ as opposed to when we use µ , which is impossible because the MP-MD representation should be independent of the map used (the certainty equivalents must be the same). This proves that for any map µ , we cannot have that the unique minimizing prior belongs toΦ . We now turn to argue that also for such map the two MP-MD representations must represent the same preferences. Given our last result, the only possibility for this not to be the case is that, for this map µ , there exists a lottery p for which all the minimizing priors in the second representation belong toΦ . We will now argue that this cannot be the case. If it were, then value of p computed using map µ and a prior inΦ must be strictly below the value of p computed using the same map and the worst prior in (Φ\Φ ). And since we have proved that the we cannot have that the unique minimizing prior for the first representation belongs toΦ , then this means that the value of p computed using map µ and a prior inΦ is strictly below that computed using map µ and the worst prior in Φ. At the same time, notice that the value of p computed using the worst prior inΦ and map µ is weakly above that computed using the worst prior inΦ and a 'non-increasing' map like µ above. In turns, however, we have proved that for any such map, this must be equal to the value computed using the worst prior inΦ ; by construction, this must be weakly higher than the value assigned by the first representation when using map µ . But this means that we have some p such that the value assigned by the first representation when using map µ is strictly lower than the one assigned by the same representation when using map µ . This contradicts the fact that a MP-MD representation represents the same preferences regardless of the map, as these lotteries would have a different certainty equivalent depending on which map we use.
Step 3. Consider now the representation in Claim 27, and for every φ ∈ Φ construct first the corresponding probability density function (PDF), pdf φ . Notice that pdf φ is well-defined since every φ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (this follows from the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, (Aliprantis and Border, 2005, Theorem 13.18) ). Moreover, notice that since every φ ∈ Φ is state-increasing, then every pdf φ is a non-decreasing function in [0, 1] . Moreover, since every φ ∈ Φ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, then pdf φ is never flat at zero. For each φ ∈ φ , construct now the corresponding cumulative distribution function, and call the set of them Ψ. Notice that every ψ ∈ Ψ must be convex, strictly decreasing, and differentiable functions -because the corresponding PDFs exist, are non-decreasing, and never flat at zero. We are left to show that Ψ is point-wise compact: but this follows trivially from the standard result that for any two distributions φ, φ on [0, 1] with corresponding CDFs ψ and ψ such that both are continuous on [0, 1], we have that φ → φ weakly if, and only if, ψ → ψ pointwise.
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The desired representation then follows trivially, as does the existence of a minimal representation. Finally, the unique properties of the minimal representation follow trivially from the uniqueness properties of the representation in Claim 27, discussed above.
we denote p n → w p to indicate weak convergence, f n → p f to denote point-wise convergence, and → to indicate convergence in R.
Proof. Consider ψ n ∈ Ψ ∞ , ψ ∈ Ψ, p n ∈ ∆(X) ∞ , and p ∈ ∆(X) as in the statement of the Claim. (What follows is an adaptation of the Proofs in (Chateauneuf, 1999, Remark 9 ) to our case.) Notice that since X is a connected and compact set, and since u is continuous, we can assume wlog u(X) = [0, 1]. Also, for any t ∈ [0, 1], define A t := {x ∈ X : u(x) > t}. Then, notice that for any p ∈ ∆(X) and ψ ∈ Ψ we have
and for all n, then by the Dominated Convergence Theorem (see (Aliprantis and Border, 2005, Theorem 11.21) ) to prove that RDU u,ψn (p n ) → RDU u,ψ (p) we only need to show that H n (t) → H(t) for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. To do this, we denote M p := {r ∈ [0, 1] : ∃x ∈ supp(p) such that u(x) = r}, and we will show that we have H n (t) → H(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]\M p : since p is a simple lottery (with therefore finite support), this will be enough.
Consider some t ∈ [0, 1]\M p , and notice that we must have that A t is a continuity set of p. To see why, notice that, since u is continuous, A t must be open, and we have that δA t = {x ∈ X : u(x) = t}; and since t / ∈ M t , then we must have p(δA t ) = 0. By Portmanteau Theorem 42 we then have p n (A t ) → p(A t ). We will now argue that for any such t we must also have H n (t) → H(t), which will conclude the argument. To see why, consider any t ∈ [0, 1]\M p , and notice that we must have
At the same time: |ψ n (p n (A t )) − ψ n (p(A t ))| can be made arbitrarily small since p n (A t ) → p(A t ) and ψ n is continuous; and |ψ n (p(A t )) − ψ(p(A t ))| can be made arbitrarily small since ψ n → p ψ. But then, we must have H n (t) → H(t) as sought.
Notice, therefore, that we can apply standard generalizations of Berge's Theorem of the maximum, such as (Aliprantis and Border, 2005, Theorem 17.13) , 43 and therefore prove that Axiom 3 (Continuity).
Next, we turn to prove the necessity of Axiom 5 (Hedging). To this end, let us define the notion of enumeration.
Definition 10. A simple enumeration of a lottery q is a step function
Let N (x) ∈ N be the number of steps in x, and x n be the value of f (x) at each step, and p x (x n ) be the Lebesgue measure of each step x n .
Claim 29. Let p be some lottery, and x, y be two simple enumerations of p such that x i−1 x i for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, if ψ is a convex RDU functional and u is a utility function that represents , we have
, which must be smaller or equal
42 See (Billingsley, 1995, Chapter 5) . 43 In particular, in our case the correspondence ρ in the statement of the theorem would be constant and equal to Ψ, which is non-empty and compact, while the function f in the statement of the theorem would correspond to the function RDU u,ψ (p) seen as a function of both ψ and p -which, as we have seen, is continuous.
Proof. We begin by proving the claim for cases in which p y map to rational numbers, then extend the claim using the continuity of W . As p y (y i ) is rational, for all i ∈ 1, . . . , N (y), we can write each p y (y i ) = mi ni for some set of integers {m i } and {n i }. This means that there are a set of natural numbers {k i } such that p y (y i ) = ki ni . Notice that we can rewrite the step function y as a different step functionȳ defined by the intervals [ and min t ∈ N|p y (y t ) ≥ j+1 ni . In other words, we have split the original step function y up into a finite number of equally spaced steps, while preserving the value of the original function (again we can do this because the original function had steps defined by rational number). We can therefore now think ofȳ as consisting of a finite number of elements of equal length that can be interchanged using the procedure we discuss below Note that redefining y in this way does not change the function -i.e. y(t) =ȳ(t) ∀ t, and nor does it affect its utility -i.e. W (y) = W (ȳ). Now order the steps ofȳ using , breaking ties arbitrarily: letȳ 1 denote the best step ofȳ,ȳ 2 the next best element and so on. We next define a sequence of enumerations and functions recursively:
1. Let 1ȳ =ȳ. Define the function 1 r : {1...N (y)} → N such that 1 r(j) is the original position ofȳ j for all j (i.e. 1 r(j) = n ∈ N| 1ȳ i r(j) =ȳ j ). 3. Define i r(j) as the position of y j in iȳ for all j (i.e. i r(j) = n ∈ N| iȳ i r(j) =ȳ j )
2.
So, at each stage, this procedure takes the previous function, looks for the ith best step ofȳ and switches it into the ith position in the enumeration (while moving whatever was in that slot back to where the best element came from). The function i r keeps track of the location of each of the steps ofȳ in each iteration i.
The first thing to note is that the final element in this sequence, niȳ , is equivalent to x, in the sense that W (x) = W ( niȳ ): clearly, each of these switches preserve the Lesbegue measure associated to each prize, thus niȳ is an enumeration of p. Furthermore niȳ i−1 niȳ i for all i by construction, meaning that u( niȳ (t)) = u(x(t)) for all t.
Next, we show that W ( i y) ≤ W ( i−1 y) for all i ∈ {2, .. n i } First, note that it must be the case that i−1ȳ i ȳ i : in words, the ith best element ofȳ must be weakly better than whatever is in the ith slot in i−1ȳ . To see this, note that, if this were not the case, then it must be the case that To extend the proof to enumerations with irrational p functions, take such a function y, and associated x that is the rank order enumeration of y, whereby p y (y i ) is not guaranteed to be rational for all i ∈ 1, . . . , N (y). Now note that p y is a vector in R N (y) . Note that we can construct a sequence of vectors q i ∈ Q N (y) such that q i → p y . Define the simple enumeration y i as the step function whereby y i (t) = y n for t ∈ [ We now turn to prove that the Axiom 5 is satisfied. Again we will prove this only for degenerate actsthe extension to the general case being trivial. Let p, q be two lotteries such that p ∼ q and r ∈ p,q . Let x be the enumeration of r, then there must be two enumerations z x and z y such that: 1) z i = Note that the enumerations are not in rank order, but, by Claim 29, reordering can only decrease the utility of the enumeration by shuffling them into the rank order for every π ∈ Π. Letz x andz y be the rank order enumerations of z x . We must then have that U (r) is larger or equal than We now turn to Axiom 1 (FOSD). Let π be a continuous RDU functional. We know (e.g. (Wakker, 1994, Theorem 12,) ) that it respects FOSD. Thus, suppose that p first order stochastically dominates q, and let π * ∈ Π be the functional that minimizes the utility of p. We know that the utility of q under this functional has to be lower than the utility of p, thus the utility of q (which is assessed under the functional that minimizes the utility of q) is lower than that of p Finally, Axiom 2 (Monotonicity) and Axiom 6 (Degenerate Independence) follow form standard arguments, while Axiom 4 follows from Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Notice first of all that both 1 and 2 we can follow Steps from 1 to 4 of the proof of Theorem 1, and obtain two preference relation 1 and 2 on F , both of which admit a representation as in Claim 13 of the form (u 1 , P 1 ) and (u 2 , P 2 ). Notice, moreover, that we must have u 1 = u 1 and u 2 = u 2 , and we must also have, by construction, P 1 = Π 1 × Φ 1 and P 2 = Π 2 × Φ 2 .
Suppose now that we have that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1 . Then, we must have ⊕ 1 = ⊕ 2 , which implies that u 1 is a positive affine transformation of u 2 . But this means that u 1 is a positive affine transformation of u 2 , which means that, since both 1 and 2 are biseparable and have essential events (as proved in the steps from the proof of Theorem 1), then by (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002 , Proposition 6) 1 and 2 are cardinally symmetric. Moreover, since 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1 , it is easy to see that we must have that 2 is more uncertainty averse than 1 in the sense of (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Definition 4) . We can then apply (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Theorem 17) , and obtain that we must have P 2 ⊇ P 1 . Since P 1 = Π 1 × Φ 1 and P 2 = Π 2 × Φ 2 , this implies Π 2 ⊇ Π 1 and Φ 2 ⊇ Φ 1 . Now suppose that we have Π 2 ⊇ Π 1 , Φ 2 ⊇ Φ 1 , and that u 1 is a positive affine transformation of u 2 . This first of all implies ⊕ 1 = ⊕ 2 . Moreover, it also implies that u 1 is a positive affine transformation of u 2 , and we must have P 2 ⊇ P 1 . Again by (Ghirardato and Marinacci, 2002, Theorem 17) we then have that
